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Summary
The brief examines how regional developments in 
Central/South Asia may affect the stabilization process 
in Afghanistan. Given that regional security dynamics 
played an important role in aggravating the conflict 
in Afghanistan in the 1990s, the report juxtaposes the 
situation in the 1990s with the present state of affairs. 
 
The brief argues that the regional dynamics in 2010 are 
very different from the 1990s and puts forward four 
arguments to that effect. First, the improved India- 
Pakistan relationship is crucial for regional stabil-
ity. In assessing prospects for positive developments 
between India and Pakistan, it is necessary to factor in 
broader regional concerns, especially the now cordial, 
yet tense relations between the rising powers India 
and China. Second, with its new economic and politi-
cal weight, the stage is set for China to take the role 
as regional hegemon in the wider Central/South Asia 
region, although it is uncertain if or when it will choose 
to enact this role. Third, regional energy projects might 
in the long-term increase cooperation and build confi-
dence, but developments are slow. By contrast, im-
proved transport networks and increased trade have 
positively affected the region. Fourth, Iran’s nuclear 
program poses an indirect, but serious challenge to 
regional stability. 
 
Take together these four arguments highlight the 
increas ing salience of India and China. Moreover, the 
brief illustrates how regional affairs in 2010 are a mix 
of inter-state rivalry and insecurity together with pat-
terns of economic cooperation. The risk still exists that 
regional insecurities could aggravate the internal rival-
ries in Afghanistan and the regional environment cer-
tainly creates additional challenges to Afghanistan’s 
stabilization process. However, the regional environ-
ment looks less prone to feed into and augment inter-
nal rivalries when compared with the 1990s. 
Introduction: Four arguments on regional change1
What are the prospects for stabilization in Afghanistan 
if or when international security forces pull out? This 
question has gained relevance since President Obama 
announced the withdrawal of US troops starting July 
2011 in his address on a new strategy for the war in 
Afghanistan (New York Times 2009). Taking as our 
starting point the regional dimension of the ongoing 
conflict and the history of neighbourly involvement 
in Afghanistan in the 1990s, we examine how regio­
nal dynamics might affect the country after the with­
drawal of NATO forces. Will there be a repeat of the 
scenario from the 1990s, when neighbouring states 
significantly exacerbated the conflict? 
Our aim is not to give a complete overview of regional 
developments, nor provide a full outline, or prediction, 
of how regional affairs may shape Afghanistan after 
2011.2 Instead, in order to stimulate creative thinking 
on Afghanistan’s regional context, we challenge con­
ventio nal conceptualizations of the region, deve lop ing 
four arguments related to the following issues : i) the 
India–Pakistan relationship; ii) the rise of India and 
China, and its impact on regional affairs; iii) economic 
cooperation in the region, and iv) the role of Iran. 
A basic perspective here is that regional affairs today 
are significantly different from the situation in the 
1990s: it is important to acknowledge these changes 
and factor them into assessments of how a post­with­
drawal Afghanistan might develop.
1 This policy brief is a shortened version of the authors’ NUPI 
report Regional Change: How will the rise of India and China 
shape Afghanistan’s stabilization process?
2 For a useful overview see Harpviken (2010).
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Argument 1: There is more to the India–Pakistan  
relationship than Kashmir and the quest for  
‘strategic depth’
The effects of the troubled Indian–Pakistani 
relationship on the Afghan conflict are well known. It 
was Pakistan’s quest for strategic depth in Afghanistan 
in the face of the perceived security threat from India 
that motivated Pakistan’s support to the Taliban. A 
friendly regime in Kabul has long been a key security 
goal for military strategists in Pakistan, and the Taliban 
was seen as a helpful ally in this quest. After the events 
of 9/11, Pakistan’s new political leadership declared its 
support to NATO. Nevertheless, accusations continue 
to be levied that Pakistan’s intelligence service, the 
ISI, maintains close ties to the Taliban. The recent 
release of classified US security documents provides 
additional evidence of substantial ISI support (Mazzeti 
et al. 2010; Wiki leaks 2010). 
It has been argued that Afghanistan, like Kashmir, 
has become a proxy war between India and Pakistan 
(Dalrymple 2010). India’s large­scale economic and 
diplo matic support to Afghanistan and President 
Karzai has further exacerbated Pakistan’s longstanding 
secur ity fears that Afghanistan may become a launch­
ing pad for Indian presence and dominance in 
the region. This provides continued incentives for 
Pakistan’s national security strategists to maintain 
sup port to militant Islamist groups that can help 
thwart Indian control in the larger South Asian region.
While it is correct to say that the India–Pakistan 
relationship continues to serve as a primary source of 
instability in the region, and, indirectly, of instability 
in Afghanistan, analysts tend to overlook the broader 
dimensions of this relationship. It is increasingly 
unhelp ful to analyse the India–Pakistan relation solely 
with reference to the historically wrought bilateral 
relationship, the Kashmir issue and Pakistan’s quest 
for strategic depth. With the recent accelerated rise of 
India and China, regional relations have become more 
complicated. Pakistan–China and China–India rela­
tions are important considerations for Pakistan and 
India when they formulate their foreign policy, not 
least as regards their bilateral relations. 
Policy implications
The improved India–Pakistan relationship is of crucial 
importance for the stability of the region and hence for 
the stabilization of Afghanistan. In assessing the pro­
spects for positive developments between India and 
Pakistan, it is necessary to factor in broader regional 
con cerns, particularly Pakistan–China and China–
India relations. 
Argument 2: China is the regional hegemon, but is  
reluctant to play its part
China has established comprehensive economic and 
political ties with all of Afghanistan’s neighbours, 
and holds key levers of potential influence in these 
countries. China has also expanded its involvement in 
Afghanistan. With substantial Chinese engagement, 
the region differs markedly from that of the 1990s when 
China was scarcely present, aside from its histori cally 
close ties with Pakistan. Moreover, no power held sub­
stantial influence in all of Afghanistan’s neigh bours 
during the 1990s, as is the case with China today.
However, despite its potential weight, China has 
been defining its interests in Central and South Asia 
relatively narrowly. Chinese engagement in the region 
reflects Beijing’s traditional foreign policy goals – inter­
nal stability, energy security and good­neighbourly rela­
tions – which are constrained by two concerns: i) the 
aware ness that the regional and global rise of China 
could spark a backlash of anti­China policies and alli­
ances; and ii) the principle of non­interference in the 
inter nal affairs of states. This rationale, alongside 
Beijing’s longstanding foreign policy principles of risk 
aver sion and gradualism, may explain the low level of 
secur ity engagement in Afghanistan. 
No such limitations, however, are imposed on economic 
policy. Chinese investments and global economic 
expan sion are usually explained with reference to two 
fac tors: proximity and abundance in natural resources. 
Afghanistan shares a border with China; in addition, 
the country is rich in copper and iron and has large 
deposits of industrially important minerals like mer­
cury, sulphur, chromite and talc (USGS 2007). As 
such, it seems set to become a key recipient of Chi­
nese investment. The China Metallurgical (Group) 
Cor po ration (MCC) has already invested heavily in the 
Aynak copper mine; this may serve as an indicator of a 
larger investment flow that could be released, follow­
ing stabilization in Afghanistan. 
China seems set to become a major economic and 
political force in Afghanistan in the medium to long 
term, with likely positive impacts on its development 
and reconstruction. In the short term, however, China 
will be no game­changer. Beijing has no plans to assist 
NATO­led anti­Taliban efforts. It is in China’s interest 
to wait for the situation in Afghanistan to stabilize, 
and then start with greater investment activity. 
Policy implications
China’s economic and political weight constitutes a 
solid basis for adopting the role of a regional hegemon. 
When and to what extent Beijing will take on this role 
is not yet certain. However, China’s engagement in the 
affairs of Central/South Asia needs to be considered 
in relation to its global role. Political engagement in 
the region will be shaped by how Beijing (re)defines 
China’s global position: a more active and assertive 
China globally will entail a more proactive Chinese 
factor in the politics of the region. 
Argument 3: Energy developments are slow but trade 
is booming, and this fosters cooperation
There is a nascent, yet significant, liberal element to 
regional affairs. Substantial increases in trade and 
3transport, with associated positive effects on economic 
growth, create incentives for interstate cooperation. 
Key domestic constituencies in several countries have 
an interest in maintaining the status quo – or a further 
improved and stabilized version of it. The scale of the 
increase in trade and infrastructure is a major factor 
that distinguishes regional affairs of the 2010s from 
the 1990s. Economic cooperation, according to the 
liberal perspective, has positive side effects; it may also 
serve as an important counterweight to the structural 
rivalry and insecurity that characterize many interstate 
relations in the region (Hirschman 1997; Keohane 
and Nye 2001). We briefly discuss the implications of 
regional cooperation in trade, transport and energy.
Trade patterns in Central and South Asia have 
undergone important changes. With the growth of 
China, India and Iran, key regional export markets 
have emerged and intra­regional trade has grown, 
in particular between Iran and China, China and 
Pakistan, and China and India. Moreover, exports 
from the key regional economic powers to wider inter­
national markets are on the increase. With the planned 
improve ments in transit networks, some 20% of this 
global trade could transit the region, resulting in sub­
stantial transit fees (Sachdeva 2007: 376). These are 
powerful economic arguments for the liberalization of 
regio nal trade (Joshi 2010: 14). Thus far, however, trade 
flows have faced serious barriers, due mainly to the 
animosity between India and Pakistan.
Energy relations in the region are shaped by the fact that 
the countries of Central Asia have a great surplus in oil, 
gas and hydropower, whereas the South Asian states 
suffer from major energy deficits and are searching for 
stable supplies. This has spurred the development of 
several plans for energy generation and export routes, 
some of these transiting Afghanistan’s territory. Most 
ambitious is the proposal for a unified electric grid (the 
CASA 1000), alongside the gas transportation projects 
Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India pipeline 
(TAPI) and Iran–Pakistan–India. These are important 
and positive plans, but most of them are unlikely to be 
realized in the short to medium term due to security 
concerns in Afghanistan, as well as disagreements 
between India and Pakistan. 
 
Policy implications
The proposed energy projects will have positive 
implications for regional development, adding a con­
struc tive and cooperative element to the Pakistan–
India relationship and providing both powers with 
a stake in peaceful development. Crucially, however, 
many of the larger projects in the hydropower, oil and 
gas sector have been postponed and seem likely to be 
realized only in the medium to long term. This implies 
that these grand projects cannot bring immediate 
positive benefits to the region or to Afghanistan. By 
con trast, transport investments and trade increases 
have already delivered substantial regional benefits. If 
these continue to grow, important counterweights to 
inter­state insecurity and competition will be created. 
The focus should therefore be directed to bottom–up 
developments in trade and associated infrastructure 
that have immediate and tangible impacts.  
Argument 4: Iran: the nuclear stand-off complicates 
Afghanistan’s stabilization process
Iran is perceived as playing a double game in Afghani­
stan. On the one hand, Tehran offers significant sup­
port to Afghanistan’s stabilization process – from 
facilitation of the Bonn agreement through substantial 
aid and reconstruction programmes, to trade and the 
fight against drug trafficking (Chopra 2007; Gavrilis 
2009). On the other hand, the Iranian government 
is accused of supporting the Taliban and other insur­
gent groups (Gates 2007; Bruno and Beehner 2009). 
Substantial evidence has been provided to support 
these allegations; nonetheless, Tehran denies its 
involve ment while experts continue to disagree 
whether the Iranian government is directly involved 
in undermining US interests in Afghanistan. 
This contradictory strategy seems to be informed by two 
concerns: 1) Iran’s security and commercial interests 
in having a stable Afghanistan as its neighbour; 2) 
Iran’s relationship with the USA and the related 
threat of retaliation against nuclear proliferation. 
Given the history of a strained relationship with 
Afghani stan under the Taliban, Tehran has a clear 
interest in cooperating with the anti­Taliban coalition, 
which could have led to ‘a genuine strategic opening’ 
between Iran and the United States (Bruno and 
Beehner 2009). However, the failure of the G.W. Bush 
admini stration to acknowledge Iranian peace efforts 
in Afghanistan, its labelling the country as a ‘member 
of the axis of evil’, and Iranian fears that tensions with 
the USA over its nuclear programme could exacerbate 
may have played into Iranian calculations, resulting in 
‘a strategy of managed chaos’ in Afghanistan (ibid.). 
This strategy simply aims to destabilize Afghanistan 
by strengthening the insurgents. The underlying 
ratio nale is to signal Washington of Iran’s central 
role for the stability of Afghanistan, thus enhancing 
its bargaining position vis­à­vis the United States. In 
that way, Tehran raises the bar for the US decision­
makers wishing to respond militarily to Iran’s nuclear 
programme. At the same time, it is important to bear in 
mind that pursuing this strategy entails serious politi­
cal, economic and security risks for Iran, indicating 
that Tehran may pursue such a strategy only out of 
extreme necessity (New York Times 2007).
Policy implications
Iran’s role in the region remains a difficult issue 
– perhaps even more difficult than in the 1990s, 
despite significant improvements. This development 
is related mainly to the threat of retaliation against 
nuclear proliferation. In addressing Iran’s nuclear 
challenge, the following considerations are important: 
1) any further exacerbation in US–Iranian relations is 
highly likely to have a negative effect on Afghanistan; 
2) Iran–US cooperation in Afghanistan has great 
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potential for the stabilization of Afghanistan, as 
well as for improving bilateral relations; 3) involving 
China would create a potential lever, since China is 
an increasingly central player, both as a permanent 
member of the UN Security Council and an importer 
of Iranian energy. 
Conclusion: the regional environment of Afghanistan 
has improved since the 1990s, but remains a  
challenge
The four arguments presented in this policy brief 
com municate forcefully the substantial changes in 
Afghanistan’s regional environment in 2010 as com­
pared with the 1990s. While interstate competition and 
security fears dominated regional affairs in the 1990s, 
in 2010 we see a mix of interstate rivalry and insecurity 
together with patterns of economic cooperation. The 
risk remains that regional insecurities could aggravate 
the situation in Afghanistan in the years ahead as 
internal politics continue to be fragmented and highly 
com petitive. However, the regional environment 
now appears considerably less prone to feed into and 
exacerbate these internal rivalries than it did in the 
1990s. The considerable traditions of diplomatic dia­
logue, China’s tacit influence throughout the region 
and the increasing economic incentives for maintaining 
regio nal stability are important counterweights in this 
respect.
Whether these new features will prove strong enough 
to uphold a stable trajectory in further tests on the 
region remains to be seen. What is certain, however, 
is that these liberal aspects represent major new deve­
lop ments in regional affairs – and it is crucial that 
these be factored into the analysis of regional affairs.
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